We examine the wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt offerings in the Canadian market for the period between 1991 and 2004. The average wealth effect for the three day event window is a significantly negative -2.7%. This result is in line with previous studies on other Anglo-Saxon markets, but it is different from other markets where generally no effect or even a positive effect is found. In addition, support is found for the negative effect of both debt-and equity-related agency costs.
INTRODUCTION
A question that receives considerable attention in the theoretical as well as empirical corporate finance literature is why companies issue convertible debt. While practitioners put forward notions such as delayed equity, lower coupon rate and "sweetening" of deals that are otherwise hard to sell 1 , academics have proposed theories that relate the use of convertible debt to informational asymmetries (Brennan and Kraus, 1987 , Brennan and Schwartz, 1988 , Kim, 1990 , and Stein, 1992) , agency issues (Green, 1984 , Mayers, 1998 , and Isagawa, 2000 and tax motives (Jalan and Barone-Adesi, 1995) . These theories in general suggest that companies that face high debt-and/or equity-related agency costs could benefit from issuing convertible debt as opposed to other "straight" means of financing. Prime candidates for issuing convertible debt are companies for which straight debt or equity do not provide the most efficient way of financing. These include companies to which one of the following problems applies: difficulty in estimating risk, possession of ample growth opportunities, high costs of financial distress, financial constrains, and/or high agency costs.
A convertible bond, from now on to be referred to as a convertible, is a bond that can be exchanged for a predetermined fixed number of "new" shares of the issuing company within a predetermined period of time. In essence, a convertible is a package consisting of a straight bond and warrants written on the issuing company stock. 2 Empirically it is well documented that different security types induce different wealth effects at the time of their announcements. For example, seasoned equity offerings induce the strongest negative wealth effects (see, e.g., Masulis and Korwar, 1986, Mikkelson and Partch, 1986 , and Asquith and Mullins, 1986 ) of between -2.5 and -4.5 percent, while straight debt issues induce only slightly (many times insignificant) negative wealth effects (see, e.g., Dann and Mikkelson, 1984, and Eckbo, 1986) . Given the hybrid character of convertibles, we can expect that the size of the wealth effects associated with the See, for example, surveys of managers by:
announcements of convertible security offerings will be between those for straight debt and equity.
Previous studies on stock market reactions to the announcements of convertible debt issues in the U.S. market document significant negative effects of convertible debt announcements in the range between -1 to -3 percent. 3 Other studies on Anglo-Saxon markets find similar results, that is, Magennis, Watts and Wright (1998) and Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) find significantly negative effects for the Australian and the UK markets respectively. Outside the Anglo-Saxon markets, the empirical evidence has been somewhat less conclusive. Burlacu (2000) , Dutordoir hybrid nature of convertibles and the institutional and regulatory differences among countries and markets seem to be the driving force of the divergence. This makes the analysis one of the more interesting fields in empirical corporate finance today, since convertible debt can be structured to be either more debt-or equity-like as to mitigate some of the risks and deficiencies associated with each of "plain" securities.
Following Burlacu (2000) , Lewis et al. (2003) and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2005a), we estimate the structure of the convertible debt design (i.e. how debt-or equity-like it is) by employing the delta measure. The delta measure relates the price sensitivity of a convertible to the underlying equity, and takes values between 0 and 1. A value closer to 1 suggests that the convertible is more equity-like, since the probability of conversion is higher. As an alternative measure of the convertible debt design we use equity-to-debt component ratio, where equity and debt components are estimated using the valuation approach proposed by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) . Note that issuers of convertibles that are more equity-like are supposed to be more adversely affected by equity-related costs, while debt-like issuers are more negatively affected by debt-related costs.
According to adverse selection models on capital structure (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984) , we expect that more debt-like offerings are associated with less negative abnormal returns and more equity-like offerings with more negative abnormal returns. Moreover, we do not expect more debt-like convertible offerings to be significantly affected by equity-related agency costs and more equity-like convertible offerings by debt-related agency costs.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to provide further evidence on the market reactions to convertible debt offerings. The second objective is to examine the nature and determinants of the size of the wealth effect with respect to issuer characteristics and relate the findings to theories about motives for the use of convertible debt. We examine the influence of several issuer characteristics on announcement reactions in the Canadian market in the period between 1991 and 2004. This study is related to previous, mainly U.S. based research, since the Canadian market shares many of its design features with its U.S. counterpart and adds to the literature on the use of convertible debt. To our knowledge this is the first study that examines the wealth effects associated with convertible debt issues in the Canadian market.
Our empirical findings are mostly in line with the seminal work of Myers and Majluf (1984) on external financing and the role of informational asymmetry. As in the U.S., the event study analysis shows that wealth effects associated with the announcements of Canadian convertibles offerings yield significantly negative abnormal returns of around -2.7%. The analysis shows that this is to be attributed to the more equity-like nature of most of the convertibles issued in the Canadian market in the period under consideration, in particular before 2000.
With respect to the firm-specific determinants of announcement price reactions, we find that the abnormal returns are driven by factors related to both the debt-and equity-like features of convertible debt: interest coverage, which affects debt-related costs, and stock price run-up (overvaluation issue), which drives equity-related costs. Firms that pay dividends are consistently found to have higher cumulative average abnormal returns related to the announcement of the convertible offerings, as the dividend payout serves as a disciplining device that lowers equity-related agency costs. These results appear to be robust across different specifications, i.e. when we control for the stated use of the proceeds (acquisitions, capital expenditures or refinancing). These findings are in line with the theories that relate the use of convertible debt to mitigate different aspects of informational asymmetries. We do not find support for tax arguments for the use of convertible debt. With respect to the control variables, our results indicate that firm size in some cases negatively affects the abnormal market response at the time of a convertible debt announcement. This is somewhat surprising to the extent that both debt-and equity-related costs are expected to be reduced for larger firms, but could also be viewed from the perspective that opaqueness increases with the size of a firm.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical models yielding the testable hypotheses for our study. Section 3 describes the sample, provides some summary statistics, and discusses the methodology. In Section 4
we present the empirical results on the announcement returns and their determinants.
Section 5 gives the conclusion.
SHAREHOLDER REACTIONS TO CONVERTIBLE DEBT ANNOUNCEMENTS

2.1.
Wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt offerings A general explanation of why investors react negatively to security offerings follows from the informational asymmetry between managers and the market with respect to value of assets in place and/or future growth opportunities. In this respect, security offerings are viewed as special examples of the lemons problem presented by Akerlof (1970) . The models of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) can be viewed as specific applications of the lemons problem. According to these models, when a company issues risky securities, investors will demand a discount on the security price in order to be compensated for a potential overvaluation of the firm. Therefore, the announcements of convertible issues are predicted to have a negative impact on the issuer's stock price.
From the results of previous studies it appears that the abnormal returns may be driven by the type of the financial system. Market-oriented systems, including those in the U.S., Given the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) , the possibility of underpricing and the nature of the convertibles (hybrid securities) we test the following hypothesis regarding the wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt offerings.
Hypothesis 1: The announcement of convertible bond offerings by companies
in Canada has a significant negative market valuation effect.
Determinants of the size of wealth effects
In general the following characteristics determine market response to convertible debt By adjusting the parameters of the issue (maturity, conversion price, callability, etc.)
issuers can structure the convertible to be either more straight debt-like or more equitylike. More debt-like convertibles will have higher conversion prices (and consequently higher conversion premiums) and/or shorter maturities than more equity-like bonds, all else being equal. By classifying convertible issues into more debt-or equity-like as captured by the delta measure (see Section 3.3), we will test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2:
The market valuation effect will be more negative for equity-like convertibles than for debt-like convertibles.
The effect of issuer characteristics on the size of the wealth effect associated with the announcements of convertible debt offerings can, in general, be separated according to the dominating nature of the convertible issue (debt-versus equity-likeness) and related to the motives for issuing such security. Convertible debt is a particularly useful financing instrument in cases where informational asymmetries and market imperfections make the use of straight debt or equity more costly or even impossible.
As Brennan and Schwartz (1988) From the equity component perspective, Kim (1990) and Stein (1992) argue that convertibles are delayed equity and are used to signal the quality of the firm in the framework of informational asymmetry. This is consistent with the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) , where conventional equity issues are unattractive due to high issue costs and dilution. Kim demonstrates that the conversion ratio serves as a credible signal of a company's future earnings. Stein argues that good quality firms issue debt, while medium quality firms differentiate themselves from bad quality firms by issuing convertibles.
If the nature of a convertible issue is more equity-like, the equity-related adverse selection costs should negatively affect the price reaction to convertible debt offerings.
Lucas and McDonald (1990) show why equity issues on average are preceded by positive abnormal returns. However, in line with the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) , costs associated with issuing equity should be higher for companies with larger stock run-ups, since they are more likely to be overvalued. Another aspect of the issuer's characteristics is related to the equity-like nature of convertibles: the free cash flow. Jensen (1986) points to the adverse effect of free cash flow on the value for shareholders, in particular in low growth firms. He proposes debt to be a better control or bonding device for managers than payout policy, as company's future payouts can be changed, while debt has to be repaid. Nevertheless, it has been documented that reductions in dividends lead to negative wealth effects for shareholders, and managers try to avoid negative changes in payout policy. This is especially the case if their compensation schemes are related to shareholder value creation. Therefore payout policy has a disciplining function for managers to act in shareholders' best interests. We therefore test the following two hypotheses with respect to the agency cost of free cash flow (agency cost of equity). Compared to straight debt, convertibles offer much less trade-off between interest tax shields and cost of financial distress. In the case of straight bonds, higher interest tax shields are only achievable through higher indebtedness, which increases the probability of financial distress. On the other hand, convertibles offer the benefit of interest tax shields. However, they give a smaller probability of financial distress. 5 We expect a positive effect of the tax burden (marginal tax rate) on the size of abnormal returns, 5 A direct test of this tax motivated argument for the issue of convertible debt is also related to calls of convertibles, which we will not address in this paper.
especially in the case of more equity-like convertibles, implying some evidence on the tax motive argument. We therefore also test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: Income taxes positively affect the market valuation, in particular for more equity-like convertibles.
From the reasoning so far it follows that price reactions to convertible debt announcements should be negatively influenced by both debt-and equity-related agency costs, since convertible debt encompasses both debt-like and equity-like components. We consider three additional factors that influence both debt-and equity-related costs.
First, both debt-related costs (e.g. risk uncertainty and financial distress costs) and equity-related adverse selection costs should be lower for larger companies. Larger firms tend to be more familiar to the market, lowering its respective issuing costs because less information search and processing costs are required. On the other hand, the size of the company increases the complexity and analysis, so that the larger company might shareholders. This negative impact should be more pronounced for equity-like convertibles. It is not likely to be detected in the overall sample of convertibles, since its role should be less strong for more debt-like convertibles. However, there is also the opposite potential impact of slack. It can be viewed as a build up of internally generated and needed funds for increased capital expenditures, when the external sources of financing are very costly. This is in particular the case for companies with higher risk and larger growth opportunities (more equity-like issuers). We therefore include slack in our cross-sectional analysis without hypothesizing its overall effect on the valuation, since it does not only have a negative effect of increased agency cost of equity, but also a positive effect of internal (less expensive) build-up of funds. In addition, slack can also be viewed as collateral, in which case it should have a positive effect on valuation in case of debt-like convertibles, where it mitigates agency costs of debt.
Thirdly, a firm with good growth opportunities should face reduced debt-and equityrelated agency costs. De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that expectations in the market regarding the profitability of the firm's projects reduce the potential for both the asset substitution problems and adverse selection problems described earlier. We therefore expect that the following hypothesis should hold.
Hypothesis 6: Better growth opportunities of the firm positively affect the market valuation.
Finally, we investigate the effect of the stated use of the proceeds. In the offering prospectuses, firms state the purposes for which the proceeds will be used, such as financing acquisitions, refinancing debt, capital and general expenditures.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Sample selection
The sample consists of convertibles issued between January 1991 and December 2004 by
Canadian companies that were listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. During that period there were 207 convertible bond issues in total. We excluded issues made by financial companies (SIC division H -Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), and were left with 149
issues by non-financial companies. Data on announcement dates and other features of the convertible bond issues were obtained from the SDC database and checked against press releases in Lexis-Nexis, Canadian newswires, company web sites and the SEDAR 6 database. For 26 issues in our final sample, we have found discrepancies in the announcements dates. In those cases we used the earliest announcement date that we could find. The criteria for an issue to be included in our sample were:
The announcement date had to be verifiable through a source other than SDC.
The issuing firm's stock price data had to be available in DataStream.
The issuing firm's accounting data had to be available in DataStream.
The announcement should not confound with other corporate announcements.
The conversion option relates to the equity of the issuing company (no exchangeable bonds) 7 .
The issues of the same issuer had to be at least 120 trading days apart in order for the estimation and even periods for different issuers not to overlap.
Given the criteria, the initial 149 issues by non-financial companies first shrink to 129 due to stock price data availability, and further down to 107 issues due to accounting data availability. Of those 107 issues, we could not verify the announcement date for 10 of them; 4 were exchangeable bonds or their conversion price relates to other than the underlying equity; 3 were too close together with the previous issues of the same issuer, causing the overlap; and 4 were joined together with the issues (by the same issuer)
announced on the same or the previous day. This means that our final sample consists of 86 bond issues offered by 77 different companies. The breakdown of issues over the years is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 here > From Table 1 it appears that 60 percent of the issues in our sample were offered after the end of 2000. This is approximately comparable with the issue year breakdown of all the non-financial companies' issues (136 of them) in the period, with somewhat better coverage in the sample towards the end of the sample period due to scarce data availability for the beginning of the 1990s. Offerings seem to exhibit some bunching, with hot periods being 1993-1994 and the end of the 1990s onwards.
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Event study methodology
The announcement effects of the convertible bonds are estimated using an event study methodology as described in e.g. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). For the market portfolio use the Standard & Poor's TSX (Toronto Stock Exchange) value-weighted price index, which is widely considered as the benchmark for Canadian equities. It accounts for more than 200 stocks listed on the TSX or about 70% of the total market capitalization. Denoting the announcement period, reported by SDC, as day 0, the estimation period ranges from day -120 to day -20.
Proxies
The variables that are used in the analysis are related to the hypotheses described in Section 2.
Leverage. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio between total debt and total assets. 
Where S is the current price of the underlying stock, K is the conversion price, δ is the continuously compounded dividend yield, r is the continuously compounded yield on a selected "risk-free" bond, σ is the annualized stock return volatility, T is the initial maturity of the bond and N(.) is cumulative normal probability distribution. The delta measure always takes value between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 indicate a high sensitivity of the convertible bond value to changes in the underlying equity (stock)
value, implying a high probability of conversion. As a proxy for the risk-free rate we use the yield of a Canadian government benchmark bond of the closest matching maturity rounded upwards. For the stock price volatility measure we use the annualized volatility of stock returns as estimated over the period (-120,-20) relative to the announcement date of the offering.
In order to differentiate between equity-and debt-like convertibles we use a delta cut-off value of 0.5. We will denote the sub-sample with a delta smaller than 0.5 as more debtlike, while the sub-sample with a delta greater than (or equal) 0.5 will be referred to as the more equity-like sample. As an alternative measure of the size of the equity component in convertible debt, we use the ratio of equity to straight debt component value of convertible bond (ED). Values of equity and debt components are estimated using the convertible debt valuation approach proposed by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) . We estimate the model price of the convertible bond at the issue, where the price is the sum of equity (value of the conversion right) and straight debt component. We use values of ED greater than 1 as the reference for the more equity-like convertibles, and values of ED lower than 1 as the reference for the more debt-like convertibles.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Wealth effects associated with the announcement dates of convertible debt offerings
In Table 2 we present the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAAR) and tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the wealth effects associated with the announcements of the convertible debt offerings. Table 2 here > In Panel A of Table 2 the results for the total sample are presented. CAARs are significantly negative over different event windows for the total sample. In particular, the size of the effect for the event window (-1,1) is a significantly negative 2.7%. These results are in line with the results from previous studies, in particular those for the U.S.
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market. Panels B and C of Table 2 report the CAAR for the sub-samples with a value of the delta measure above 0.5 and below 0.5 respectively. The first interesting result is the comparison of wealth effects for the sub-samples in the event window (-10, -2), where the CAAR of 2.24% is significantly positive for more equity-like convertibles (delta above 0.5), and significantly negative (-0.77%) for the more debt-like convertibles (delta below 0.5). The difference between the two values is also significant. This implies that prior to the announcement of the issue, more equity-like issuers experience a significant stock price run-up. This suggests that issuers try to time their announcements after periods of favorable stock price movements. It also suggests that the market is more likely to perceive the more equity-like issuers as overvalued at the announcement dates of the convertible debt offerings in our sample, given the prior streak of positive abnormal returns. Therefore they react more negatively to the announcement. The most negative CAAR for the more equity-like issuers are in the event window (0,20) with significantly negative 6.32%, while more debt-like issuers do not experience significant wealth effects during that period. Based on the results in Table 2 we conclude the following with respect to the hypotheses. 8 Firstly, the market responds negatively to the announcements of convertible debt offerings, which confirms Hypothesis 1. Secondly, the wealth effects are significantly more negative for the more equity-like convertible issues than for the more debt-like issues. This confirms Hypothesis 2. Figure 1 here > Figure 1 shows the evolution of the CAARs over the event window (-20, 50) for the total sample as well as for the two sub-samples with a delta measure above or below 0.5. A striking result is that the wealth effect continues to grow negatively after the announcement date. For the total sample, we find a CAAR of -1.35% at the announcement of the issue, while over the event window (-1,2) the CAAR drops to -2.87%
and continues to fall to -4.62% over the event window (0, 20) . From the analysis of the two sub-samples it appears that the more debt-like convertible issues (delta below 0.5) experience negative abnormal returns somewhat prior to the announcement, i.e. -0.77%
over the event window (-10,-2), and this rebounds after the announcement of the offering to around 0. Conversely, the more equity-like convertible issues (delta above 0.5) exhibit a significantly positive abnormal return reaction prior to the issue announcement (2.24%
in the event window -10,-2), but this becomes significantly negative after the announcement by decreasing to around -4% over the event window (-1,2) and even further to -6.32% over the event window (0,20).
Inspection of Issue and issuer characteristics
In order to explore the characteristics of the issues and the issuing companies we examine some descriptive statistics for the total sample and the two sub-samples according to the delta measure. Selected descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 here > From Table 3 it appears that the more debt-like convertible issues (Panel B) have significantly lower conversion premiums (ratio between conversion price and stock price at the announcement date of the issue) and shorter maturities than more equity-like convertibles (Panel C), i.e. a conversion premium of 1.153 versus 1.290, and a maturity Table 2 is obtained using the non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis test for the equality of subpopulations. These results are available on request from the authors. of 6.4 years versus 9.9 years. A significantly lower conversion premium for the more debt-like convertibles is surprising. Typically, a conversion premium for the more debtlike convertibles should be higher than for the equity-like convertible, since the probability of conversion should be lower. This is correctly reflected in significantly lower maturity and also in the lower volatility (0.21 for more debt-like convertibles versus 0.48 for more equity-like). This can be explained in terms of time varying elements (conversion price, maturity, volatility, dividend yield) that affect the value of delta measure. Most of the debt-like issues in our sample occurred towards the end of our sample period, while the opposite is true for more equity-like issues.
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As already shown in the previous section, issuers of the more equity-like convertibles experience significantly positively abnormal returns prior to the announcement of the issue, while those of more debt-like convertibles experience significantly negatively CAAR. The same conclusion can be inferred from Table 3 , as the stock price run-up over the period (-10,-2) days prior to the announcement is significantly larger by 3 percentage points for the more equity-like issuers.
Both types of issuers seem to have similar leverage on average (0.236 for the more equity-like versus 0.218 for the more debt-like). The difference between interest coverage capacity is not significant, although the Times-Interest-Earned ratio is on average higher for the more debt-like convertibles by around 0.8.
There is no statistically significant difference between the Q-ratios of the equity-like and the debt-like issues. The equity-like issues do seem to be accompanied by more risk, as indicated by a higher volatility of respectively 48% versus 21% (annually). Note that issuers of equity-like convertibles are characterized as those that might have wanted to issue equity, but due to adverse selection and agency problems this would have been too costly or impossible.
The level of slack is significantly higher for the equity-like convertibles (8.5% of the total assets versus 2.4% of the total assets for debt-like issuers). The dividend payout policy is also significantly different between the issuers of the more equity-like and those of more debt-like convertibles. While 86% of issuers of the more debt-like convertibles pay dividends, only 47% of issuers of the more equity-like convertibles do so. The ratio between capital expenditures and depreciation is on average significantly by twofold higher for more equity-like convertible issuers than more debt-like issuers. The ratio of 2.88 for the more equity-like issuers suggests that they, on average, invest in capital assets almost three times the value of depreciation in a given year. This ratio is below 1 (0.93) for the more debt-like convertible issuers, which means that their capital investments fall short to replace the depreciated assets. This may also be the reason why almost half (11 out of 24) of the more debt-like issuers use the proceeds for mergers and acquisitions -i.e. grow by acquisitions. In case of equity-like convertible issuers, only 7 out of 62 issuers use the proceeds for acquisitions. More equity-like issuers also have, on average, negative free cash flow relative to the total assets (-6.9% of the total assets), while the free cash flow for the more debt-like issuers is, on average, positive (1.6% of the total assets). This implies that, given the costly external finance, more equity-like issuers are more financially constrained than more debt-like convertible bond issuers.
Overall, the more equity-like convertible issuers seem to have slightly better growth opportunities, are riskier, are less likely to pay dividends, invest relatively more, and are more financially constrained than the more debt-like convertible issuers. This is in line 
Cross sectional analysis of determinants of the size of the wealth effect
In order to examine the impact on the size of the wealth effect due to the implicit design of convertibles (e.g. delta) and the issuer characteristics associated with debt-and equity-related agency costs, we perform a number of cross sectional regressions. In all the models we consider, the dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return in the event window (-1,1).
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In the first specification, we test our hypotheses regarding the effects of debt-related agency costs (Hypotheses 3a and 3b) , equity-related agency costs (Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c), the effect of tax burden (Hypothesis 5) and the mitigating effect of growth opportunities (Hypothesis 6) for the total sample of convertible debt issues over the period 1991 -2004.
Based on the results of the first regression specification in Table 4 hand, it could also account for the fact that dividend paying companies are usually mature and less risky companies. The more direct effect of the disciplining role of dividend payments needs to be explored on the subset of more equity-like convertible debt issuers, where the agency costs of equity are assumed to be more important. The coefficient for growth opportunities (Q) was hypothesized to be positive, but it is insignificantly negative. Therefore we can not confirm Hypothesis 6.
In the second specification in Table 4 , we additionally include a tax dummy variable in the cross sectional regression to test for the effect of income taxes on the wealth effect.
While other coefficients remain practically unchanged, we find no significant effect of taxes on the wealth effect associated with the announcement of the convertible debt offering. We therefore find no support for Hypothesis 5.
Note that such an analysis for the total sample is not the most appropriate, since the design of the convertible has to be taken into account as we argued in Section 2.2. We therefore also estimate the third specification in Table 4 , where we include a control variable for implicit issue characteristics by adding the delta measure as an explanatory variable. The delta measure reflects how debt-or equity-like the convertible issue is, and therefore it captures the issue characteristics comprehensively. Since a value of delta closer to 1 indicates a more equity-like convertible issue, we expect to find a negative relationship between the size of the wealth effect and the value of delta. The results of the third specification in Table 4 are very similar to those in specifications 1 and 2. The effect of delta on CAAR is negative, but it is not significant. The overall results suggest that perceived overvaluation, slack and payout policy significantly affect the size of the wealth effect. This is, however, due to the fact that most of the issues in our sample are more equity-than debt-like. In order to test hypotheses related to impact of debt-related and equity-related costs on the size of wealth effects, we estimate the regressions separately for two sub-samples split according to implicit issue characteristics (delta). Table 5 here > In Panel A of Table 5 we present the estimation results of these two specifications, without dummies for the proceeds, for the two sub-samples split by the cut-off value of 0.5 for the delta measure. Note that convertible issues with a value of delta below 0.5 are denoted as more debt-like, while those with a value of delta above 0.5 as more equitylike. We expect that debt-related costs will have a significant impact for more debt-like convertibles, and equity-related costs will have a significant impact for more equity-like convertibles. As the results of specifications 1 and 2 in Panel A of Table 5 show, the leverage has a positive sign for the convertible with the value of delta below 0.33 and a negative sign for those with the value of delta below 0.5. However, the coefficients are insignificant. This means that, just like in Table 4 , we don't find a confirmation for The specifications 3 and 4 in Panel A of Table 5 relate to the sub-samples of more equitylike convertible bond issues. Here, we find that proxies relating to the agency cost of equity significantly affect the wealth effects at the announcement of convertible debt issues. More specifically, the prior stock price run-up negatively affects the valuation, as there is more concern about the potential overvaluation of the equity. As in Table 4 , this result can be interpreted as a confirmation of Hypothesis 4a. The coefficients for SPRUN of -0.32 (delta<0.5) and -0.39 in the case of convertibles with the value of delta being higher than 0.67 suggest that a 5 percent positive cumulative average abnormal return in a ten day period prior to the announcement of the issue leads to negative 1.5 to 2 percent CAAR following the announcement. This is mitigated by the dividend payout policy (coefficient of 0.34 for PAYDUM), where equity-like convertible debt issuers that pay dividends on average experience 3.3 percent higher CAAR than non-dividend paying companies, in case of convertibles with the value of delta being higher than 0.5. As in Table 4 , this is in line with Hypothesis 4c. Similarly, in the case of convertible with value of delta higher than 0.67, the effect of payout policy is still positive, but becomes of less importance and insignificant. Here however, the effect of free cash flow becomes negative (coefficient of -0.113) and marginally significant. This suggests that more equity-like convertible issuers are, in addition, even more plagued with agency cost of equity, which gives some support for Hypothesis 4b. Again, as in Table 4 (GENX) 10 . In Panel C of Table 5 we present the estimation results of the specifications with dummies for the proceeds for the total sample of convertible debt issues over the period 1991 -2004. First, we do not find a significant effect of the stated use of proceeds on the valuation, as coefficients for all dummy variables relating to the stated use of proceeds are not significant. Secondly, the effect of other issuer characteristics on the wealth effects remains in line with the results from Table 4 . We conclude that use of proceeds does not seem to affect the abnormal returns.
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Finally, in Panel D of Table 5 we present the estimation results for the two sub-samples, split according to the value of the Q-ratio. We have used values of 0.9, 1 and 1.1 as cutoff points. First, the results show that stock price run-up (overvaluation concern) has a significant negative effect for the sub-sample of companies with better growth opportunities (columns 3 and 4), with coefficients of around -0.25. The dividend payout dummy is only significantly positive for the companies with lower Q (coefficient of 0.04).
Interestingly, this positive effect is not significant for companies with values of Q lower than 0.9. However, for these companies the effect of slack becomes more important (coefficient 0.6235) and marginally significant, as opposed to the extended sub-sample of lower Q companies (column 2). This might suggest that for the companies with worse growth opportunities (column 1), the role of slack as collateral becomes more important than just relying on a disciplining role of payout policy (as in the case of lower growth companies with values of Q closer to 1 -column 2). The impact of leverage on the valuation is positive (and marginally significant) in the case of lower Q companies. This is to say that, in the absence of good growth opportunities, dividend payout is not a sufficient controlling device per se. Therefore debt serves the role of this alternative, more powerful, controlling device. This is in line with Jensen's (1986) argument about
If issuers stated more potential uses of proceeds, we recorded the first use stated as predominant. 10 the relative effectiveness of payout policies versus debt as controlling device. Finally, slack has a positive (and marginally significant) effect on shareholders' wealth in the case of higher Q companies. This goes back to the trade-off between the costs and benefits of slack and is consistent with results in previous tables. In Table 6 we present the summary of hypotheses and the results. Table 6 here >
In general, our results suggest that debt-and equity-related costs negatively affect the size of the wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt offerings, in particular if issues are split according to its design characteristics (either more debt-or equity-like). We find no evidence that the use of proceeds affects the valuation. We show that the negative effect of a stock price run-up prior to the announcement, positive effect of slack, and dividend payout are consistent across different specifications and sample splits. We find no evidence for the tax hypothesis relating to the benefits of the use of convertible debt as opposed to the use of equity.
Finally, we find that companies with lower growth opportunities benefit from the additional controlling device (leverage), while companies with higher growth opportunities benefit from higher slack, as benefits of such flexible internal funds relative to costly external financing seem to outweigh the agency cost of slack, in particular when certain controlling devices are in place (payout, leverage).
CONCLUSION
In this paper we analyze the size and determinants of wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible debt offerings on the Canadian market in the period between 1991 and 2004.
Similarly to previous research for other markets, in particular the U.S., we find a significant negative wealth effect associated with the announcement date of convertible debt offerings. We also find support for the hypotheses related to the negative impact of debt-and equity-related agency costs on the size of the wealth effect. In particular, we find that the determinants of the size of the wealth effects reflect the hybrid nature of convertible debt, where convertible debt issues can be structured to be either more debtor equity-like. More specifically, we show that proxies for agency costs of equity negatively affect abnormal returns associated with the issue of more equity-like convertibles, while they do not significantly affect wealth effects associated with the more debt-like convertible issues. The opposite holds for the agency costs of debt. .75 *** -0.038% -0.14 -6.287% *** Table 3 Descriptive statistics for issue and issuer characteristics for total sample, sub-sample with delta < 0.5 and sub-sample with delta > 0.5 Table 4   Table 5 OLS regressions of abnormal returns at the announcement date of convertible debt offering on issue and issuer characteristics for split samples Dependent variable is cumulative average abnormal return in the event window (-1,-1) around the convertible debt offering announcement. Cumulative average abnormal returns are for the sample of 86 convertible bond announcements by Canadian companies from January 1991 to December 2004. The convertible bond announcements are identified from the SDC database. Abnormal returns are based on the market model, estimated over a 100-day period for each company (from day -120 to day -20). LEV is computed as the ratio between total debt and total assets. TIE is the Times-Interest-Earned ratio. This is defined as EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) over interest expense. SLACK is the ratio of cash and equivalents over total assets. SPRUN is the cumulative average abnormal stock return measured over the window (-10,-2) relative to the announcement date. FCFA is the ratio of free cash flow (net income + depreciation -capital expenditures) over the total assets. PAYDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company paid cash dividends in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. Q is a Tobin's Q-ratio measured as (market value of equity measured as average between (-15,-5) days relative to the announcement date + book value of long and short term debt) over the book value of total assets. TAXDUM is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company paid income taxes in the previous year and value 0 otherwise. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets.
DELTA is the measure of the sensitivity of the value of convertible bond with respect to the value of the underlying equity. This measure is calculated using the option pricing model of Table 6 Overview of hypotheses and the results of the tests of the hypotheses
This table gives an overview of the hypotheses that we test in this paper as well as of the results of these tests. The delta-specific and ED-specific subsample results are from columns (1) and (2) of Panels A and B in Table 5 for hypotheses 3a and 3b, from columns (3) and (4) for hypotheses 4a to 4c, and from columns (1) to (4) for hypotheses (5) and (6) . Table 2 Confirmed H2: The market valuation effect will be more negative for equity-like convertibles than for debt-like convertibles Difference in CAARs between equity-like (delta>0.5) and debt-like (delta<0.5) convertibles 
Hypothesis Proxy
Agency costs of equity
H4a: A period of positive abnormal returns preceeding the announcement date negatively affects the market valuation CAAR over the window (-10,-2) relative to the announcement date Tables 4 and 5 
